Many game-theoretic analyses of deterrence confirm the commonsense view that what determines whether a defender can effectively deter a challenger from an unwanted action is (1) the challenger's perception of the level of punishment that the defender will be able to impose on the challenger should it take the action, and (2) the challenger's level of belief about the likelihood of the defender actually carrying out this punishment. Reduction of the defender's forces may affect both the defender's ability to retaliate and its perceived willingness to do so. Game-theoretic methods are used to assess how the limits on both of these parameters are related, subject to the condition that deterrence remains effective. The results indicate that the defending side can often make do with smaller forces, provided its (apparent) resolve is high. But force structure is important-the models suggest that implementation of an "all-or-nothing" deployment (as called for by a doctrine of massive retaliation, for example) may reduce not only costs, but also deterrence effectiveness. determines whether a defender can effectively deter a challenger from an unwanted action is (1) the challenger's perception of the level of punishment that the defender will be able to impose on the challenger should it take the action, and (2) the challenger's level of belief about the likelihood of the defender actually carrying out this punishment. Reduction of the defender's forces may affect both the defender's ability to retaliate and its perceived willingness to do so. Game-theoretic methods are used to assess how the limits on both of these parameters are related, subject to the condition that deterrence remains effective. The results indicate that the defending side can often make do with smaller forces, provided its (apparent) resolve is high. But force structure is important-the models suggest that implementation of an "all-ornothing" deployment (as called for by a doctrine of massive retaliation, for example) may reduce not only costs, but also deterrence effectiveness.]
The Impact of Conventional Force Reductions on StrategicIntroduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the expansion of NATO, downsizing conventional military forces is all the rage. The reasons are primarily economic, though some would argue that in the United States military cutbacks have served political objectives as well as producing a "peace dividend."
Force changes since the late 1980s have been substantial, as both Russia and the United States reduced military spending, cut back on ground forces, and moved to a greater dependence on "all-or-nothing" strategic-level threats to ensure security (Gacek, 1994) . The current sweeping review of American defense policy by the Bush administration notwithstanding, there is no good reason to believe that this trend will not continue-in the United States, in Russia, and
elsewhere.
Yet, at the same time, these same powers are reducing their nuclear forces, both unilaterally and as a consequence of treaties like START and INF. A 1997 report of the National Academy of Sciences urged additional dramatic cuts in the two countries' nuclear arsenals, suggesting that they should eventually stabilize around 300 warheads each. The Academy also called on the United States to make a no-first use pledge, restricting the role of nuclear weapons to deterring or responding to nuclear attacks: "This country should no longer threaten to respond with nuclear weapons against attacks by conventional, chemical, or biological weapons."
Are these trends contradictory? Can downsized tactical forces maintain national security?
The benefits of reductions in the level of resources consumed by a state's military can be assessed only in comparison to the costs of these reductions in terms of the state's goals, interests, and assets. In our view, military forces have two major (non-domestic) purposes-to fight, and to deter other states from unwanted acts by threatening to fight in response. So to judge whether cuts to a military are a good idea, it is essential to understand how much (if at all) those cuts reduce the military's ability to fulfill these purposes.
It is not our intention to address here questions of the fighting ability of reduced forces. This is not to say that fighting ability is unimportant, or easy to estimate. Clearly the capacity of a military depends in large measure on its level of resources; nonetheless, it may sometimes be possible to downsize forces while maintaining their fighting effectiveness. Savings in personnel costs, for example, often follow from technical developments, as when bombers were replaced by missiles, observers by radar, or battleships by guided-missile cruisers.
We pose a different question: Even if the reduced force would actually be as effective when engaged in combat, would its effectiveness as a threat be compromised by downsizing? In other words, does the act of reducing military forces make them less effective as a deterrent?
Our question, we believe, is a practical one. Downsizing the military is rarely an issue if war is ongoing or imminent. When the actual fighting ability of the military is paramount, then its resource base is usually maintained, and cutbacks in any component are usually more than balanced by growth elsewhere. But overall cutbacks can become an issue whenever the military is not actually engaged in combat-no matter how vital the need to guard state security by threatening to respond to incursions by other states.
There are two ways that downsizing forces could diminish threat effectiveness. First, deterrence works because the threatenee fears that costs would be inflicted on it should hostilities break out. Knowledge that the threatener is reducing its forces may change the threatenee's estimate of the level of costs it would suffer should it provoke conflict. Note that it is the threatenee's perception of costs that is important here.
Second, even if ability to inflict costs is viewed as unaltered, the deliberate shrinking of the military resource base may be perceived as a signal of reduced willingness to commit forces to battle. Hitler, for example, seems to have drawn this inference from Britain's unilateral disarmament during the 1930s. In other words, downsizing one's forces may make the threat to use those forces less credible to a potential adversary. Thus the adversary's calculus may be altered both by the reduction of the perceived likelihood of conflict following the proscribed action, and the reduction of the adversary's estimate of the damage it would suffer should the conflict actually occur.
Our objective here is to explore the relationship among apparent willingness to fight, perceived ability to damage an adversary in a fight, and deterrence effectiveness, and to study whether and how this relationship changes in the context of downsizing. Our investigation is relevant in light of the apparent contradiction between the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences and the opinion, held by many classical deterrence theorist, that overkill capability is necessary for deterrence success. (See, for instance, Intriligator and Brito, 1984.) We first discuss briefly the meaning of deterrence, and exhibit a particularly simple condition for deterrence effectiveness that is robust across many models. Our study leads us to support the proposal of the National Academy of Sciences and other policies consistent with a posture of minimal deterrence, defined as "the retention of only enough nuclear weapons to provide an assured destruction capability" (Kegley and Wittkopf 1989: 351) . We argue that such a policy, properly implemented, would maintain sufficiently credible retaliatory threats, and impose sufficiently high costs on an aggressor, to stabilize relationships and ensure the success of deterrence.
We also offer comment on a deployment policy that is often associated with downsizing.
In general, the policy of "massive retaliation" is to threaten a disproportionately great response to any provocation. This policy has been justified by the argument that any reduction in threat credibility will be more than compensated by the risk of extreme damage-from large-scale 1 The literature on deterrence is voluminous. Representative of the policy debates are Curtis (2000) ; Gholz and Sapolsky (1999/2000) ; Paul, Harknett and Wiltz (1998); Quinlan (2000 Quinlan ( /2001 ; Sanger and Eckholm (1999) ; Tammen et al. (2000); and Turner (1999) . Recent empirical studies include Danilovic (2001a Danilovic ( , 2001b and Harvey (1998) . For a literature review, see Huth (1999) or Zagare (1996) .
response by strategic nuclear forces, for example. Moreover, it may sometimes be possible to restructure military forces to provide the capability of inflicting much greater damage using reduced forces, connecting massive retaliation with downsizing. We studied massive retaliation earlier (Zagare and Kilgour, 1993b) , and showed that certain strategic considerations imply that it is usually ineffective. We discuss here the relevance of our conclusions to the question of how to downsize forces.
What Makes Deterrence Effective?
In our view, a very simple framework must support any deterrence model. We assume that, in order to retain the prize, Defender has adopted a "deterrence policy."
That is, Defender has threatened to respond to any initiation by Challenger, so that the consequence of initiation would not be Challenger Wins, but Conflict. We use the term "credibility" to refer to the likelihood that this threat would in fact be carried out. 2 Since credibility is associated with a threat that Defender is assumed to have made, we refer to it as "Defender's credibility."
There are several further conditions that this modeling framework must satisfy in order to represent deterrence situations meaningfully. Of course, the actual model being analyzed determines the precise meanings of the quantities in (*), but these meanings have much in common, and the commonalities can be understood in the context of the modeling framework.
For instance, the gain and loss appearing on the right side of (*) are to be measured that results from initiation (providing there is no response) is small enough, or the loss that might be triggered by initiation (when there is a response) is great enough. All of the models to which (*) applies assume that the players do not know for certain whether there will be a response (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000) . (There are other uncertainties in some models, such as whether
Challenger will counter-respond, or which response option Defender will choose.) Note that (*)
is really a comparison of Challenger's beliefs about the likelihood of a response to initiation (left side) and of Challenger's assessments of the potential gains and losses that might arise from contesting the Status Quo (right side).
Modeling the Effects of Force Reductions
In the introduction, we expressed our view that force reductions by a Defender affect the logic of deterrence in two ways, (1) by reducing Defender's credibility, and (2) by decreasing
Challenger's estimate of the cost of conflict. We now use our general condition for deterrence effectiveness, (*), to assess these effects more systematically.
Figure 1 applies (*) to identify when deterrence is effective, as a function of Challenger's cost of conflict and Defender's credibility. Notice that credibility lies between 0 and 1. 3 If the cost of conflict to Challenger is near zero, then only a Defender with very high credibility can 3 We will later identify Defender's credibility with the a priori probability that Defender prefers Conflict to Challenger Wins. A probability must be a number between 0 and 1. Recall that, with suitable interpretations, (*) applies across a wide variety of models of deterrence. Our conclusions are based on Figure 1 , which in turn is based on (*), and, therefore, are applicable to all of the deterrence models in this range. In particular, our prediction of threshold effects in downsizing applies in a wide range of deterrence situations including direct and extended deterrence relationships, and mutual and unilateral deterrence situations.
A Very Simple Deterrence Model
To gain more insight into the interpretation and significance of the deterrence effectiveness condition (*), we must give specific meaning to its terms. We will do this in the context of a very simple model of a deterrence situation. After showing that (*) applies to this model, we will compare it to other more complex models to which (*) also applies. Later, we will express our very simple model as an incomplete information game and introduce two information models that apply to it, providing us with two different viewpoints on deterrence effectiveness.
The Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game 4 is the simple extensive game shown in We now show that the deterrence effectiveness condition (*) applies to the Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game. To do so, we identify Defender's credibility, the left side of (*), with the probability that Defender chooses Resist, rather than Not Resist, at its decision node.
(See Figure 2. As an aside, we mention here some other game models in which (*) is also necessary for deterrence. The deterrence effectiveness condition applies in Zagare (1991, 1994b) and Zagare and Kilgour (1993a , 1993b , 1995 , all of which are related to, but more complex than, the Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game. To suggest the flavor of (*) in these more complex models, we discuss one of them briefly. The Asymmetric Escalation Game Kilgour, 1994b, 1998) Challenger's value for an all-out (strategic-level) conflict (that it would prefer to capitulation when Defender has escalated the conflict to the strategic level).
Thus, the deterrence effectiveness condition (*) applies across a wide variety of conceptions of deterrence. This robustness justifies its use in our study of the effects of downsizing. Now, to explore further the consequences of downsizing, we now complete the formulation of the Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game as a game of incomplete information, and exhibit its solutions. Because this game is such a simple model, it is a very useful vehicle for interpreting the effects of force reductions.
To specify the incomplete information in the Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game as a game of incomplete information is to account for the choices made by Defender. We first model Defender's utilities, allowing us to associate Defender's credibility with Defender's preference for intervention (Zagare and Kilgour, 2000) . We then identify all equilibria (technically, perfect Bayesian equilibria) of the game.
First, we always assume that Defender prefers to retain the prize. This means that Defender prefers Status Quo (SQ) to Challenger Wins (CW), or, in utilities,
Next, we assume that Defender prefers Status Quo to Conflict (Conf), for a Defender who prefers otherwise would want to induce conflict.
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We cannot say, however, whether Defender prefers Conflict or Challenger Wins; we must allow for both possibilities.
A detailed model accounting for Defender's value for Conflict would include many considerations, such as Defender's view of the likelihood that it will prevail, the costs of fighting, the possible damage it will suffer as a result of fighting, and the value of the prize (Kilgour and Zagare, 1994a) . Because at least some of these quantities are generally unknown to
Challenger, Defender's opponent, we now model the Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence
Game as a game of incomplete information.
Thus, we represent Defender's value for Conflict as a random variable D Conf drawn from a probability distribution as shown in Figure 3 . Of course, our model is a model of one-sided incomplete information; so after a random value for D Conf has been selected, it is reported to Defender but not to Challenger. Thus, both players know the distribution from which D Conf is drawn, but only Defender knows its actual value. 
Models of the Effects of Force Downsizing
Our analysis of the Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game as a game of one-sided incomplete information does not provide us with any way to model the perceived change in cost of conflict for Challenger, as we have not tried to "unpack" Challenger's values. 8 But the two models in Figure 3 do give us a picture of how downsizing would affect Defender's credibility.
The effects in models 3a and 3b are depicted in Figures 4a and 4b , respectively. 
The probability of this event equals the shaded area in Figure 4a that lies between d CW and d CW + q. If the distribution of D Conf is the roughly "bell-shaped," as shown in Figure 4a , then this probability may be unexpectedly large relative to the value of q, since the interval concerned is central, and therefore captures a relatively large amount of probability. Figure 4b shows a model of the effects of Defender's force reductions in the binary model of Figure 3b . Figure 4b shows that Defender's utility is typically reduced-whether it fights or not; in addition, Defender may be less likely to fight. The only change relevant to (*) is that Defender's credibility has been reduced by ∆p H . The meaning of this quantity is shown graphically in Figure 4b . Note that the change in deterrence effectiveness depends on ∆p H only.
Thus, these models of Defender's value for conflict can connect models of downsizing of forces to the success of deterrence. One important illustration is the all-or-nothing (massive retaliation) deployment policy that, as noted above, seems to describe the direction of recent developments in international security.
"All-or-Nothing" Deployment Policies
An all-or-nothing deployment policy is, essentially, the threat to retaliate against initiation using a response of enormous destructive power. This is a way of downsizing forces that has been claimed to enhance deterrence effectiveness. The idea is that Defender builds a cheaper response system that actually increases the cost of conflict to Challenger. For instance, in the 1950s, many strategic analysts in the United States believed that atomic and nuclear weapons provided "more bang for the buck" and were both less expensive and more effective than large US installations and conventional troop commitments to Europe. The "New Look" policy of the Eisenhower administration and the associated doctrine of massive retaliation was a policy to reduce the resource consumption of US forces. Similarly, the British deployment plan prior to World War I was essentially an all-or-nothing approach, as was France's prior to World War II. Before 1914, Britain relied almost exclusively on an escalatory threat (i.e., its fleet) to deter German expansion. And during the inter-war years, French deterrence policy rested on the threat of "massive firepower" to ward off aggression. Increasingly, the Russian deployment is an all-or-nothing approach.
Some simple but insightful views of all-or-nothing deployments can be derived from the models presented above. One important aspect of an all-or-nothing stance can be depicted using a binary model that is a variant of Figure 4b . In this variant, the right-hand spike (or probability mass) moves far to the right, indicating that Defender's response will be very powerful, if it is made at all. However the right-hand spike continues to be associated with a reduced probability;
as already noted, this probability is p H , and it is the value of p H , that determines, via (*), deterrence effectiveness. In other words, what makes deterrence work is the probability associated with the right-hand spike. Reductions in this probability cannot be compensated by moving this spike further to the right.
An all-or-nothing deployment policy causes changes in Defender's value for Conflict, which can be seen as causing changes in Defender's credibility. Figure 4 can be used to trace these effects. Another (obvious) consequence of an all-or-nothing deployment is a reduction in Challenger's value for Conflict. The effects of such a change can be seen in Figure 1 . There, the position after an all-or-nothing policy has been adopted must lie to the right of where it began, rather than to the left. Figure 1 suggests that this effect of an all-or-nothing deployment might be consistent with continued deterrence success-provided reductions in credibility are compensated by sufficient increases in the cost of Conflict to Challenger.
To resolve these questions requires a more detailed and specific study. We carried out such a study in Zagare and Kilgour (1993b) , and concluded that policies like massive retaliation are, for strategic reasons, generally ineffective. There will generally be some lower-level conflicts that cannot be deterred by the threat of a disproportionate response (that both sides would disprefer), and lower-level conflicts can sometimes escalate to higher levels. Moreover, these facts depend only on higher levels of conflict being more costly to both sides, and are deterrence is most effective when both tactical and strategic credibility is high (Zagare and Kilgour, 1995) . Significantly, no commitment to escalate first is required to support the conventional deterrence equilibrium that emerges when Defender has relatively credible tactical and strategic-level threats. Thus, our models also support the National Academy of Sciences recommendation of a no-first-use policy, provided sub-strategic forces are maintained at a significant level. Otherwise, conventional force reductions could undermine strategic deterrence.
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